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Group rights and shared interests​[1]​

Group rights are pervasive in most legal systems and are the foundation of international law. Legal rights are ascribed to a variety of organised groups such as corporations, teams, institutions or states and we also use the language of group rights to refer to the rights of classes or categories of people, such as women, workers, travellers as well as to national or cultural groups. But ascriptions of moral rights to some groups are problematic for both conceptual and normative reasons. 
Conceptual analyses of the nature of rights treat them as instruments that protect either individuals’ choices or their well-being or both. For this reason, it is unclear that groups can hold rights since it is doubtful that they have the kind of agency that would enable them to make choices or the kind of irreducible moral status that would allow us to talk about their well-being. But even if this conceptual obstacle is overcome, and groups can be ascribed moral standing, we are faced with serious normative concerns. On this count, the worry is that the rights of groups might conflict with, and possibly override, the rights of their individual members. Cases of oppression in the name of preserving group identity or culture are not uncommon. If groups are conceived of in the same way as individual right-holders, that is, as irreducible objects of moral concern, their interests might trump those of their members. 
	In response to this concern, many liberals who want to hold on to individualist commitments while making room for cultural or national allegiances have put forward a different view, according to which group rights – including rights to collective self-determination – can be justified on the basis of individuals’ interests, and are only held against outsiders (Kymlicka, 1995). If that is the case, there is no possibility of a conflict with the rights of individual members; moreover, this kind of view is thought to be able to bypass metaphysical questions about the nature of groups.
This strategy has become very popular and it underlies, albeit sometimes only implicitly, many liberal(-nationalist) accounts, which seek to justify group or state rights.​[2]​  These liberal proponents of group rights often rely on the justification provided by Joseph Raz and popularised by Will Kymlicka. The appealing feature of this view, namely its individualist ontological and normative commitments entails that various groups, from stamp collectors to nations and populations of states, can be treated on a par, namely as mere collections of individuals united only by a shared interest. This strategy thus relies on what Peter Jones calls the 'collective conception' of group rights (Jones, 1999a). But in spite of its popularity, very few philosophers have provided rigorous analytical arguments in support of this conception.​[3]​ This paper tries to fill this gap and examine more closely the collective conception of group rights. 
I argue that this strategy does not succeed and genuine group rights cannot be justified merely on the basis of individual interests. A necessary intermediate step is to ascribe an irreducible interest to the group as a whole and arguably embrace a conception of groups as distinct entities, with ‘a life of their own’. This argument implies that nationalist or collectivist accounts of group rights are more consistent than individualist ones although not necessarily more plausible. 
The paper is structured as follows: first, I outline two alternative conceptions of group rights together with the central tenets of the two main theories of rights. Next, I consider the challenges faced by a justification for group rights based on the collective conception. This argument comes in two steps: the first is that a justification based on shared interests is either unsuccessful or has high costs; the second is that, even when shared interests can ground rights, they are more plausibly seen as individual rights, that is rights held by members of a class severally rather then by a group qua group. I conclude that a justification based on interests must posit an irreducible collective interest in order to ground group rights but this presupposes the corporate conception of group rights. The aim of this paper is not to argue that groups cannot have rights but only to challenge what is considered an appealing account of group rights, i.e. the collective conception, and show that it cannot evade some difficult questions regarding groups' agency and/or moral standing. 

1. Group rights: the theoretical framework

We should start with a definition of group rights. Jones explains that ‘a right is a group right only if it is held by a group qua group rather than by its members severally’ (Jones, 1999a, p. 354). It is important not to confuse group rights proper with individual rights ascribed in virtue of group membership (Jones, 2008, pp. 2-3). Exemptions from legal prohibitions for members of some religious groups, claims to parental leave, and the rights of asylum-seekers are all examples of individual rights granted in virtue of group membership or a feature that some people share. The holder of a group right, by contrast, is the group rather than its members as separate individuals. 
But, depending on how the right-holder is conceived of, two conceptions of group rights can be identified in the literature: the more ‘traditional’, corporate conception and the collective one, mentioned in the introduction.​[4]​ A first assumption of the corporate conception is that the group holds the right as a unit, just like an individual human being; ‘the rights of a group are “its” rights rather than “their” rights’ (Jones, 2007, p.2). The group is thus seen as an individual, a distinct entity, separate from its individual members. Jones suggests that this implies a second assumption of groups as entities with an independent moral standing; this assumption likens the group to a person.​[5]​ Many conceptual as well as normative reservations about group rights presuppose the corporate conception. The conceptual concerns are mostly related to the second assumption since it is unclear that groups should be seen as entities with moral status; however, the first assumption can raise normative concerns of its own since seeing the group as a unit allows for the possibility of conflicts between the rights of the group and those of its members.
However, a different conception of group rights has recently emerged in the literature, which Jones calls ‘the collective conception’. On this alternative conception, a right is held jointly by the group’s members; the right is ‘their’ right rather than ‘its’ right. This implies that there is no group with a separate identity and moral or ontological status; the right-holder is a mere collection of individuals. Note that on this view, a group cannot have rights against its own members. If the right was held jointly, that is by all members of a group together against its members, each member would end up having a right against him/herself, which is conceptually incoherent ‘granted the usual assumption that people cannot hold rights against themselves’ (Jones, 2007, p. 6). For this reason, the collective conception rules out ‘internal restrictions’ and can only accommodate rights against outsiders. Thus, if a group is to have rights against its own members, it must be conceived as a corporate conception right-holder, that is as an entity that is separate and distinct from its own members.
If these are two freestanding ways of conceptualising group rights, they could each be in principle combined with any theory of rights in order to yield group rights. The two main candidates are the choice or will theory and the interest or benefit theory. The collective conception, however, has been mainly put forward in combination with the interest theory and in particular the variant proposed by Raz.​[6]​ Nevertheless, it seems to me that the connection between the collective conception and the interest theory is not accidental. If we envisage groups without a distinct identity, an interest can serve not only to delineate the group but also to provide a ground for their rights, without assigning them a moral standing of their own.
A mere collection of individuals who share nothing but an interest, such as cyclists in a city or stamp-collectors, can become right-holders on this view regardless of what other features they share. ‘What unites and identifies a set of individuals as a group for right holding purposes is simply their possessing a shared interest of sufficient moment’ (Jones, 1999a, p. 357). So if the interest theory justification fails, so does the collective conception.
	A quick overview of the two theories of rights is thus necessary here. The most basic premise of the interest theory is that rights protect an aspect of someone’s well-being or their interest. Thus, a necessary condition for having a right is having an interest in the performance of a duty by someone else. The choice theory denies that this is the case. By contrast, the choice theorist maintains that having control over the performance of a duty by someone else is both necessary and sufficient for being the holder of the corresponding right. On this view, rights confer choices and need not advance their holders’ well-being. Thus, a choice theory right-holder must be capable of choice; for this reason, the choice theory cannot ascribe rights to groups without ascribing them a degree of (moral) agency and therefore seems to require the corporate conception.​[7]​
Note that the debate between the choice and the interest theory is about the concept of rights; in other words, the two theories seek to clarify what it means to have a right, not to provide a ground or a justification for rights. But at least the most widely used version of the interest theory, which is Raz’s, entails such a justification in the sense that the ground for a right is built into the definition of a right. The interest theorist maintains that duties correlate with rights just in case they confer a benefit on someone. But duties often benefit many people and in order to avoid an unhelpful proliferation of rights, the interest theorist typically claims that beneficiaries of a duty are right-holders only when the duty is specifically designed to secure their benefit (Jones, 1994, pp.28-32). There are different ways of answering the question about the ‘direction’ of a duty but one popular strategy, adopted by Raz and many modern interest theorists,​[8]​ is to argue that duties can be paired with rights when the interests they serve justify the imposition of the duty, which means that the interest theorist must also have an account of what justifies a duty and therefore a right. Furthermore, interests give rise to rights when they constitute a ‘sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty’ (Raz, 1986, p. 166). We should note that it is typically the case that interests constitute such sufficient reasons when they have a certain weight but this need not be the case, as I will illustrate in the next section, which examines an interest theory justification for group rights. 

2. Shared interests and rights

Joseph Raz put forward the most influential statement of interest theory group rights. According to him, 
A collective right exists when the following three conditions are met. First, it exists because an aspect of the interest of human beings justifies holding some person(s) to be subject to a duty. Second, the interests in question are the interests of individuals as members of a group in a public good and the right is a right to that public good because it serves their interest as members of the group. Thirdly, the interest of no single member of that group in that public good is sufficient by itself to justify holding another person to be subject to a duty (Raz, 1986, p. 208).

The first condition is one that any interest must meet in order to ground a right, namely it must be able to justify holding others to be under a duty. Duties create (sometimes considerable) burdens for people and an interest should be able to override this kind of competing consideration. For this to be the case, an interest should normally have a certain weight, especially if the competing considerations are not trivial. An interest usually points to something that is of value to people so the more valuable the good in question is, the weightier the interest. 
But note that the collective conception assumes that the underlying individual interests are by definition too weak to make up for the burdens of providing a (public) good. These interests thus point to a value that does not occupy a very high rank on our scale of value. So the sharing of an interest is thought to make up for its weakness. For example, one cyclist’s interest in there being safe and convenient cycle ways in a city is not enough to justify a duty in the city authorities to build them. However, ‘the shared interests of all cyclists might well suffice, in which case we could say that the cyclists collectively possess a right that the cycleway be built’ (Jones, 1999a, p. 357). The crucial assumption is then that the fact of sharing can strengthen the case for the existence of a duty in others. Let us call this the ‘value added thesis’ (VAT). This thesis can be interpreted in two ways.
The first interpretation of VAT – VAT1 - is that the fact of sharing makes the interest itself more valuable. The view here is that an individual interest of that kind points to a low-ranking value but a shared interest points to a higher-ranking value that can defeat competing considerations. In other words, the fact of sharing (mysteriously) ‘transforms’ the interest itself into a weightier one so it changes the nature of the interest and 'promotes' it on the scale of value.
A second interpretation of VAT – VAT2 – would hold that, rather than strengthening the interest itself, the fact of sharing provides additional grounds for holding others under a duty. The interest itself remains the same but protecting a shared interest secures more units of the same, low-ranking value and, in doing so, is able to defeat competing considerations. The fact of sharing is thus not relevant for the nature of the interest but only for the justification of a duty. In short, on VAT1 the fact of sharing makes the interest itself more valuable, while on VAT2 protecting a shared interest creates more value. 
But the claim that the nature of the interest can change simply because it is shared is implausible; aggregating interests cannot change their nature. This is not to deny that if several people value something this shows that it is valuable. But if that is the case, it only means that the fact of sharing gives us more evidence for the weight of an interest, not that it makes it more valuable. It might be suggested that when certain interests are common to a group of people, a metamorphosis occurs whereby a different and weightier interest emerges. To illustrate this transformation, we might think of an analogy with an orchestra.​[9]​ When the members of the orchestra play together, something emerges ‘that is more than the mere adding together of the sound of each instrument taken separately’. But the analogy does not work in my view; the reason why this happens when an orchestra plays a piece of music is because each of the instruments plays a different sound that is part of a work of art carefully put together precisely in order to produce this effect. This can happen spontaneously as well but the point is that each sound complements the other in order to produce that effect. A shared interest, however, is more similar to an orchestra’s playing the same note, where what emerges is that same note, only louder. 
My assumption here is that a shared interest refers to an individual interest that is common to a set of people, rather than a ‘combined’ one. This is because the idea that a different, combined interest emerges out of shared interests is not compatible with the collective conception of group rights. If the shared interest is something more than the individual interests added together, something ‘over and above’ those interests, it must be an irreducible group interest. The group is thus seen as a single, separate unit and the right based on this interest is no longer a group right conceived along the lines of the collective conception, i.e. one held jointly by a group’s members. The collective conception thus presupposes VAT2. 
On VAT2, the nature of the interest, or the value it points to, does not change. But, although a unit of this value is insufficient to defeat competing considerations, several units of the same value can achieve just that. This version is more plausible on the assumption that numbers make a difference to our duties. Faced with a choice of saving many people from paralysis versus saving a person’s life, it is not implausible that we have a duty to save the many even though the interest that the one person has in staying alive is presumably weightier than the interest each person has in not being paralysed (Raz, 2003, p. 346-67). This version also explains why the size of the group matters, as Raz maintains: 'although the existence of the interest does not depend on the size of the group, the existence of the right and its strength does’ (Raz, 1986, p. 209). So the more widely shared an interest is, the more likely it is to defeat competing considerations.
But this argument does not show that this duty corresponds to a right and making that step in the argument has costs that the interest theorist may be unwilling to pay. The thesis that the interest theorist wants to hold on to is that rights are logically prior to duties. In response to earlier, Benthamite variants of the interest theory, H. L. A. Hart aptly pointed out that if a right-holder is simply the beneficiary of a (legal) duty, then all talk of rights could be reduced to talk of duties (Hart, 1982). Rights are thus mere appendixes to duties. The modern interest theorist refutes this criticism by insisting that rights are grounds of duties rather than mere reflexes of them; which requires that rights be logically prior to duties. This enables the interest theorist to avoid a collapse into ‘naked instrumentalism’, i.e. a view that reduces rights to mere instruments of policy or collective goals (Simmonds, 1998, pp. 195-211).
But this thesis is at odds with VAT2 and, more generally, I would argue, with a justification of rights that does not start with interests of a certain weight or importance. If all rights are markers of interests that achieve a certain threshold of importance it is easy to see how they are logically prior and can ground new duties when the protection of the interest requires it. But if the argument for the existence of a right must first establish that an interest grounds a duty, duties become logically prior. This is a more general criticism of the strategy adopted by the interest theorist, which I cannot pursue here, but it is particularly pertinent in the case of VAT2. The assumption here is that a shared interest is not qualitatively different from an individual one but only that their aggregation can justify a duty to provide a certain good. I will accept here that a duty can be justified in this way but, even if this argument ultimately yields a right, this right will not be logically prior to the duty. So the interest theorist must choose here between a consistent theory of rights, which entails VAT1 hence the corporate conception, and the collective conception of group rights that presupposes VAT2. In other words, the view that group rights are consistent with ontological and normative individualism is at odds with the assumption that rights occupy a special place in our moral vocabulary. 
Furthermore, even if the interest theorist can overcome some of these difficulties, a new problem occurs when trying to identify the right-holders. If the interests grounding the rights are ultimately individual interests it may be reasonable to assume that the beneficiaries of the right, hence the right-holders are individuals. In the following section, I examine and refute several possible arguments in support of the conclusion that rights grounded in individual interests could be held by a group qua group.

3.  Interests, goods, and rights

Let us recall first that, on the collective conception, a right belongs to the group qua group if it is held jointly by all members of a group. It is crucial for understanding a right along the lines of the collective conception that it is not held by the group as a single entity, which would entail the corporate conception, or by individual members severally, which yields individual rights. So let me clarify the notion of a jointly held right.
For Jones, this means that ‘the members of the group together possess a right that none of them possesses separately’ (Jones, 2007, p. 3). In other words, the right only attaches to individuals together and not to each and every individual separately. Thus, a right held jointly by a group should be distinguished from the sum of rights that a group’s members might possess severally, which would be individual rights. We get a better grip of ‘jointness’ if we imagine a number of people acting jointly to lift a heavy piece of furniture. Each individual’s effort is necessary for lifting it and they are only jointly sufficient. Similarly, the ‘contribution’ of each and every member of a group is necessary for holding a right and they are only jointly sufficient. 
So why would a right based on individual interests be held jointly by those individuals? Two possible reasons can be identified in the two conditions that distinguish a collective right from an individual one on Raz’s definition. One, the public good condition stipulates that the interest in question is an ‘interest of individuals (as members of a group) in a public good and it is a right to that public good because it serves their interests as members of the group’, while the other – the justification condition - says that ‘the interest of no single member in that public good is sufficient by itself to justify holding another person to be subject to a duty’. The interest theorist could argue that rights with these features, if any, are subject to a ‘holding constraint’,​[10]​ i.e. they cannot be held by individuals severally. Thus, if any such rights exist they must be held by a group. I will argue that these conditions are not sufficient, even jointly, to support the holding constraint.

3.1. Public goods 

A number of theorists have focused on the public good condition on the assumption that it could be sufficient to support the holding constraint. The thrust of the argument here has been that some goods by their very nature can only be the object of collective rights, if they are the object of a right at all. Raz’s formulation suggests that public goods are such candidates. The thought here is that since public goods are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, their provision benefits a number of people so the whole group must be the right-holder (Réaume, 1998, pp. 8-9; Jones, 2007, pp. 6-8). 
But it has been aptly pointed out that there is no conceptual barrier in ascribing rights to public goods to an individual (Jones, 2007, pp. 6-8). First, there is no conceptual reason why I could not have a right, as an individual, to a whole cycle-path. Second, if some goods were non-excludable but only valued by a single individual, who was the sole beneficiary, the right could be ascribed to that individual.​[11]​ This shows that the non-excludability feature has no bearing on the identity of the right-holder (Réaume, 1998, pp. 7-9; Jones, 2007, pp. 7-8). 
So it is not that an individual right to a public good is conceptually incoherent but it is unlikely that the interest of a single individual can justify a duty to provide a public good. In other words, the public good condition was not supposed to be taken as sufficient on its own but in conjunction with the justification condition. The thought here is that, if the duty is justified by the interests of several individuals, taken together, it will be owed to all those individuals. This is because, according to this version of the interest theory, the right-holder is the entity whose interest is sufficient to justify the duty. 
But while this is more straightforward in the typical case of individual rights, I want to argue that in the case of rights based on shared interests, the justification of the right does not necessarily indicate the right-holder. When it comes to individual rights, the individual whose interest justifies the duty tends to also be the beneficiary of the right. But this is not always the case; Raz himself argues that reference to the interests of others, or the common good, can contribute to making the case for an individual right (Raz, 1994, pp. 52-55). An example is a journalist’s right not to disclose his/her sources, which is justified by reference to the interests of the larger public but is nevertheless an individual right. This shows that the justification of a right is not always aligned with its ascription, even in the case of individual rights since the interests that justify the right do not always indicate who the direct beneficiary is. 
So the fact that it takes the interests of several individuals to justify a duty is not sufficient to show that all these individuals are joint right-holders; for this to be a group right, it must benefit them jointly rather than severally. It would seem, however, that if the benefits provided by a public good are individualisable, they are enjoyed by individuals severally so the right in question might be a right held by individuals rather than a group. ‘Whether one can have a right as an individual to any good depends upon whether it is one which is individualizable’, Réaume explains (Réaume, 1988, p. 8). In order words, rights to public goods that provide individualisable benefits are not necessarily collective rights although they may be.
However, many rights that benefit several individuals are more plausibly construed as individual rights. Many (legal) duties, for instance, are designed to protect an interest that several individuals share yet the corresponding rights are normally construed as rights held by individuals severally, or by a ‘class’, but not a group qua group. Class action suits are an example in point: although the interests of several individuals suffice to establish a breach of duty only taken together, the rights involved are individual rights. Rights to goods such as clean air or a clean environment are also most plausibly construed as individual rights even though no single individual’s interest is likely to be sufficient to ground such a right; and I am suggesting that many other rights to goods that involve the provision of resources or material benefits should be analysed in the same way. 
One reason is that the contrary suggestion that rights based on shared interests would be held jointly leads to a counterintuitive result. At the start of this section I offered an explanation of a ‘jointly-held’ right according to which each and every member is necessary for holding the right. If a right to a public good was jointly held, it follows that all and only those individuals whose interest grounds the right are joint right-holders. So if the group of cyclists, for example, lost or gained members the right would either disappear or would not be extended to new members (Jones, 2007, p. 20). This is clearly not a tenable view. 
So, in summary, there is no reason why a right to a public good that nevertheless provides individualisable benefits has to be held jointly by those whose interests constitute the ground of such a right. Furthermore, some rights to public goods, more precisely rights that require the provision of some resources are, in my view, best seen as a sum of individual rights. To be more precise, the duty to provide a public good that provides individualisable benefits corresponds to a bundle of individual rights, although not necessarily rights to that good. In other words, the suggestion here is not that each individual has a right to the (whole) public good but that s/he has a more fundamental right such as a right to pursue one’s chosen goals or a right to a share of resources, which may ground a duty to provide a share of the good to each individual. Each individual has an interest in, and perhaps a right to, a healthy lifestyle and environment, which may ground a duty to provide each person with a certain amount of resources in order to do so. But it will not ground a duty to put in place a public bicycle system, unless there are sufficient others whose rights can be fulfilled in this way. 
This also explains why a larger group is more likely to have a right to a good whose provision requires more effort or resources and it allows the interest theorist to reply to the objection made in the first part of the paper, where I argued that justifying group rights on the basis of shared interests entails seeing duties as grounds of rights. This is because the duty to provide a public good could be seen as one grounded in a different, more fundamental right of individuals, which makes that right logically prior.
So we have established that the two conditions are not sufficient to support that ‘holding constraint’, if the public good provides individualisable benefits. Moreover, it was suggested that rights to such goods are more plausibly construed as individual rights rather than genuine group rights. This argument explains, rather than contradicts, the thought that ‘random’ groups of individuals, such as cyclists, women, G20 protesters etc., do not have collective rights although they may have individual rights based on their shared interests. 
But there is a sub-set of public goods, namely ‘participatory’ or ‘communal’ goods, whose benefits can only be enjoyed jointly so rights to these goods can only be jointly-held rights, it is argued. This argument is more likely to yield a jointly-held right, if successful, and is more suitable for certain types of group, such as cultural or national groups, which are generally the focus of arguments for collective rights.

3.2. Participatory or communal goods

These ‘participatory’ or ‘communal’ goods, (Réaume, 1989 & Waldron, 1993) are such that they are ‘available to an individual only if that individual participates in their enjoyment with others’ (Jones, 2007, p. 11). Examples of such goods are a convivial party, friendship, speaking a language or indeed a culture. The key point here is not that their benefits are available to everyone but rather that the benefits they provide are not benefits for an individual unless others participate in the production and/or enjoyment of the good. So the beneficiary of a right, hence the right-holder, cannot be an individual but a group of people taken together. If the benefits of a right only accrue to individuals taken jointly, the right must be held jointly as well. But we should distinguish two different claims here: one is that the good itself is a joint activity, another is that a good can only be enjoyed jointly. I will discuss them in turn.
In Réaume’s account, the crucial feature of participatory goods is the fact that their production and enjoyment is unified; the ‘good is the participation’ (Réaume, 1988, p. 10). A convivial party is a good because we are taking part in it together; the ‘publicity of the production itself is part of what is valued’ (Réaume, 1988, p. 10). So the assumption here is that the good itself consists in the joint activity of participating. How are we to conceptualise a right to a participatory good understood in this way? It seems clear that, if the right is to the good of participation, the corresponding duty is a duty to participate, which can only fall either on current participants, who would be required to continue participating, or would-be participants who would be required to start participating. 
Now, I take it that would-be participants are members of the group that claims a certain right. That is to say they are members of the group who, in spite of having an interest in the provision of a good, are not themselves participating in its production.​[12]​ For example, a linguistic group consists of all individuals who would be capable of speaking a certain language. Yet some members actively participate in the joint activity of speaking that language, while others are mere would-be participants in that they could participate but, for various reasons, use a different language on a daily basis.​[13]​ These (reluctant) would-be participants, who are nevertheless members of the group, are the ones who would bear the duty to participate. 
If these are the duty-bearers, this is a right of the group against its own members. Notwithstanding the problematic normative implications, such a group right, understood along the lines of the collective conception, is also incoherent. Assuming that the right would be held jointly by all members of a cultural group, including the reluctant participants, it would be a right that some members have against themselves, which is conceptually incoherent.​[14]​ Thus, for a group to have a right to a participatory good, i.e. a right against its own members, it must be conceived as an entity that is separate and distinct from its own members; in other words, a right to the good of participation presupposes the corporate conception. Alternatively, the right could be seen as belonging to a sub-set of the group, that is the actual participants, against would-be participants, i.e., other members of the group. But this is no longer a right of a linguistic or cultural group, but simply the right of some of the group’s members against others. This would be a right of a group against (some) outsiders if the group consists of active participants only; I take it that it is not the kind of right that the interest theorist seeks to justify by appealing to shared interests in a culture. 
But if all members have an interest in having a participatory good, even if they do not engage in its production themselves, could it be a right that all members of the group hold jointly against outsiders? Here we can imagine two ways of conceptualising this right against outsiders: either as a negative claim, i.e. a claim to non-interference with a participatory activity, or as a positive claim to be provided with the conditions necessary for the production of a participatory good. The negative claim is sometimes taken to be the conclusion of arguments that seek to justify the rights of (whole populations of) states to non-interference (or self-determination)​[15]​ on the basis that their citizens participate jointly in the production of certain goods. The positive claim entails a duty of outsiders to provide the group with certain resources that would facilitate the production of a participatory good, which is what many groups, particularly minority groups within a state, often claim. Let us consider them in turn.
If a claim to non-interference is to be seen as a right to a participatory good it must be a claim to be free to participate in the production of that good. More specifically, it is a liberty to engage in an activity protected by a claim that outsiders refrain from interfering with this activity. But liberties are usually held by individuals and individual rights are both feasible and suitable in this case. Since the activity in question is made up of individual actions, each member of the group must possess both a liberty and a claim against interference for the activity to take place.
It could be objected here that the activity in question is not reducible to individual actions but it is in fact a joint action undertaken by the members of the group. Hence a claim against interference with this action must be held by the participants jointly. For this argument to suceed, it must assume that those claiming the right are already engaged in this activity. But this would justify, once again, not the right of a whole group but rather a right held by those members who are already engaged in participation, which is presumably a sub-set of the group that would normally be claiming the right.​[16]​ So this kind of argument cannot justify rights of entire (populations of) states to non-interference unless it is shown that each and every citizen participates in a joint activity. Furthermore, this argument does not generate a general right to non-interference but only a claim to non-interference with specific activities. When applied to minorities within a state, this argument does not ground a right to full self-determination but a more limited claim to self-government in certain areas. 
What about a positive claim against outsiders, namely a claim ‘to the conditions that make participation possible’? (Réaume, 1988, pp. 17-18). For members of a minority group to be able to speak a language together, for example, the majority should provide education in that language as well as make certain legal provisions that do not deprive the members of the minority group of the opportunity to speak the language. But note that this is no longer a right to the good of participation, strictly speaking, since outsiders cannot provide that kind of good; rather it is a right to the conditions that would enable a group to produce the good that should be analysed just like a right to resources that was discussed at the end of the previous section. 
But arguably these claims against outsiders are derivative of rights, or interests, in the core good, which is a participatory one.​[17]​ Réaume argues that these derivative rights should be seen as group rights in the following way: the right to a (core) participatory good can only be a group right. But it was established that normative – as well as conceptual – reasons preclude groups from holding rights to these core goods, that is rights against their own members. However, since these reasons do not apply to rights of a group against outsiders we might conclude that if there are such rights against outsiders, they cannot be held by individuals. So they must be held by groups.
But Réaume’s argument contains an illicit step. She jumps from the assumption that ‘an individual cannot have a claim right to a participatory good’ to the conclusion that there can be no individual rights to any of the package of goods which make the production of the participatory good possible, such as a comprehensive education system in a minority language, for instance (Réaume, 1988, p. 24). But recall that the assumption that the good just is participation was crucial in establishing that a right to that good must be held jointly. If that assumption no longer holds, there is no reason why this must be a jointly-held right rather than a set of individual rights. 
It might be objected that a single individual could not have a right to measures that would sustain a language, such as schooling or TV programmes in that language, for example.​[18]​ But what would such a right entail? It would entail first a claim that someone provide services in this language and this someone can only be a member of the group and second, a claim against outsiders that they provide the assistance necessary to facilitate this. But these claims against outsiders are no longer rights to a participatory good but simply rights to some other goods, more specifically resources, that are necessary to sustain the production of the participatory good. If held against outsiders, a right to the measures that will help a group sustain its language is nothing but a right to a share of (financial) resources that will enable the group’s own members to provide the good and it is thus a right to an individualisable good. 
We have thus established that an appeal to participatory goods is also unable to support the holding constraint. Although rights to goods that necessarily involve participation must be held by a group, they are rights against a group’s own members, therefore the group must be seen as an entity separate from its members, which entails the corporate conception. A group’s rights against outsiders cannot, by definition, be rights to a participatory good and thus need not be rights of a group qua group. 
But we should also consider the second possibility mentioned at the start of this section, namely that certain goods provide benefits that accrue to the members of the group only jointly rather than separately. The kinds of good envisaged here are not ones that consist in the activity of participation but rather goods, such as conviviality, that are the product of participation and cannot be enjoyed by individuals separately. These might be labelled ‘communal’ instead of participatory goods (Waldron, 2003). The claim here is not just that the enjoyment of the good is inter-dependent, i.e. that one individual cannot derive benefits from the good unless others do as well; this would mean that the benefits are still individualisable. The claim must be a stronger one, namely that the enjoyment of the good is ‘primarily a property of the group rather than each of the individual guests considered by himself’ (Waldron, 1993, p. 355). 
This may be a consistent view but once again it presupposes a corporate conception of group rights. If the enjoyment of a good is a property of the group, the group is seen as an entity distinct from its members, and possibly as an entity with mental states and an ontological status akin to those of individuals. Now, Waldron rejects the suggestion that this would mean in effect ‘attributing conscious states to the group itself’ (Waldron, 1993, p. 355). I need not dispute this claim here; it may be the case that we need not see the group as a metaphysical entity with mental states. But even so, the claim that enjoyment is a property of the group presupposes a subject of such enjoyment, which is the group itself, rather than its members taken jointly. This in turn means that the group is seen as a separate entity that holds the right as a single individual hence as a corporate conception right-holder. Alternatively, the statement that the good is enjoyed by the group simply refers to the mental states of a majority or even all of the group’s members, whose mental state depends on others’ having the same mental state. But in this sense, the good is not enjoyed jointly, by the group, but rather by individual members in each other’s company. 
So we reached the conclusion that a justification that starts from individual interests that are shared cannot ground a jointly-held right. All the possibilities we considered arrived either at a right held by a collection of individuals severally, i.e. a sum of individual rights, or a right held by a group gua group but conceived of as a separate entity, which presupposes the corporate conception of group rights. 
There is, however, another possibility that was not considered so far. In the preceeding discussion, I was assuming that a shared interest is an individual interest that happens to be shared. But it might be argued that this is the wrong way to conceptualise a shared interest, which might be seen instead as a combined interest that is different from the interests that a group’s members have as separate individuals. So it might be the case that the collective conception envisages a joint interest to start with rather than separate individual interests; the right based on such an interest would be held by group members jointly. I will briefly consider this line of argument. 

3.3 Joint interests and group rights

What we need to note here is that the notion of a joint interest will not help if this interest is reducible to individual interests since that would take us back to the justification considered so far. What we are thus looking for is an interest that is held by members of a group only together but that is neither reducible to individual interests nor is it a collective interest over and above the members’ interests. As Michael Hartney points out, there are two concepts of a collective interest that meet the requirement of not being reducible to a sum of individual interests: ‘the first is that of an interest shared by the members of a group in such a way that the interest is non-individualizable. The other is that of an interest of a group over and above the interests of its members’ (Hartney, 1995, pp. 208-9). The objection under consideration wants to appeal to the first notion of non-individualisable interest but it is unclear why an interest shared by some individuals would not be reducible to individual interests. 
The thought here probably is that the interest is a joint one in the sense that each individual’s interest is intertwined with and dependent on others’ having similar interests; this interdependence is presumably explained by the fact that individuals have some interests in virtue of being members of a particular group. This is most likely what Raz also envisages when referring to an interest that individuals have ‘as members of a group’. So this kind of account only applies to some groups, namely those that are constituted and have a certain identity prior to having an interest; once again, the most likely candidates are national, cultural or ethnic groups.
But as Hartney further argues the fact individual interests are intimately related to group membership does not show that they are non-individualisable. One member’s interest is not affected by the (change in the) interests of others; in other words, individual interests are not joint in the sense of ‘jointness’ elaborated in the previous section, meaning that they are each necessary to ‘support’ each other. Therefore such a joint interest is analysable in terms of the separate interests of each member of a group and is reducible to them. People have interests that are connected to their memberships of certain groups but they are nevertheless interests they have as individuals. 
The only other notion of a joint interest is that of an irreducible interest over and above the individual interests of a group’s members. Appealing to this kind of interest seems to be the only consistent strategy open to the Interest theorist; which is indeed, I would suggest, the assumption that underlies many philosophical as well as political arguments for group rights, namely that the group as a whole has an interest (in its own survival) that transcends the interests of its members. Collective rights are often meant to protect the survival of a culture or a group that is more than the sum of its current members, possibly a group that extends into the past and the future, to paraphrase Miller. Such a view seems to require a non-individualistic social ontology and is debatable whether this is plausible. Note, however, that this is a separate issue. I am not suggesting that a corporate conception of group rights necessarily entails such an ontology; it may be possible to conceive of group as individuals or artificial persons without attributing to them full-blown ontological status. But even if that is the case, conceiving of groups as separate entities for the purpose of granting them rights entails the corporate conception.
What I aimed to show here is that a genuine group right cannot be grounded directly in its members’ interests but only in the group’s interest, more specifically an interest over and above the interests of its individual members. In fact, some interest theorists, such as Raz and Réaume, are quite explicit about resorting to this kind of strategy. Both ultimately appeal to the interest of a group as a whole rather than grounding group rights directly in shared individual interests. In a more elaborate discussion of the right to collective self-determination, Raz and Margalit claim more explicitly that this right is ultimately based on an irreducible group interest even though the group’s interest is not unrelated to its members’ interests: ‘group interests are conceptually connected to the interests of their members but such connections are non-reductive and generally indirect’ (Raz &Margalit, 1990, p. 448). Similarly, Réaume argues for ‘a conception of group rights that locates the right in the group rather than its individual members but treats the group as an artificial person’ (Réaume, 1998, p. 138).
This, in turn, presupposes a corporate conception of group rights, which leaves room for conflicts between the rights of groups and those of their members; furthermore, grounding group rights in irreducible collective interests makes it possible for the latter to take priority and override the rights of individuals. Whether such conflicts will in fact occur becomes a contingent matter; it is possible that the interests of individual members of a group will be aligned with the group’s interest but there will most likely be occasions when they will diverge, like in the many cases of endangered linguistic minorities. In such cases, there is a choice to be made between the survival and the rights of the group and those of its members. But it is clear that in such cases, protecting the group’s interest would require ‘internal restrictions’ and this is precisely what a right to collective self-determination amounts to: the right of a group to make its own rules by imposing certain restrictions on its members. 




This paper argued that the collective conception of group rights, as described by Jones, cannot get genuine group rights of the ground. This is because a justification that seeks to ground group rights in shared individual interests fails so, if the collective conception requires the interest theory, this conception of group rights fails.​[19]​ The interest theory can only ground group rights in irreducible collective interests, which means that the right-holder must be seen as an entity separate from its individual members, with a life of its own whose interests can thus conflict with those of its individual members. This need not have normatively sinister implications; the conflicts between individual and group rights need not be resolved in favour of the group. But this means that only groups that can be seen as entities with moral standing can be ascribed moral rights on the basis of interests. 
In other words, dispersed and unorganised sets of people, who are united by a mere common interest, such as women, travellers, the working class or the Occupy Wall Street movement, do not have moral rights as a group. This is not to suggest that members of these groups have no moral rights that pertain to group membership, or common features to be more precise, or that the law cannot treat these rights as if they were group rights sometimes. But the moral rights involved here are individual ones, which is not necessarily a disadvantage since individual rights can be powerful normative and political instruments. 
A further implication is that the interest theory cannot justify collective rights to self-determination for entire populations of states, if such populations are conceived of as collections of people that may have a shared interest in self-determination. An interest-based justification of states' rights will have to presuppose a ‘community’ with an independent moral standing. I assume here that it is possible, though not necessarily plausible, to argue that certain groups, such as national or cultural groups, can be seen as entities with moral standing but this means that full-blown nationalist or communitarian justifications of group rights are more coherent than more individualist, ‘liberal’ variants. But these accounts inevitably face rather hard, normative and perhaps metaphysical questions. So, contrary to that is often thought, it is the interest theory that is more susceptible to doubts about group agency and moral standing that its rival.
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^1	  Acknowledgments to be added. 
^2	  For a helpful summary of this kind of strategy, which is popular in the emerging literature on territorial rights and which she also adopts, see Margaret Moore (forthcoming, pp. 28-33). Another example is Alan Buchanan (Buchanan, 2003). Thus, one upshot of my argument is to support, but not endorse, David Miller’s ‘mild complaint’ that Buchanan ‘does not go quite far enough in pursuit of the conditions under which liberal principles can most successfully be implemented, and that, had he done so, he would have given nationality a larger role in the setting of political boundaries’ (Miller, 2003, p.270). 
^3	  Some notable recent contributions to the analytical literature include James Morauta (2002) and Dwight Newman (2011).
^4	  It is important to note that these are conceptions of group rights rather than groups; in other words, they describe a way of conceiving the holder of a collective right rather than groups in general. So, if a group is seen as a corporate conception right-holder, this does not imply that it must be structured like a corporation. 
^5	  Jones does not distinguish between these two separate assumptions and implies that taking a stand on the former issue implies a certain view on the latter. I would argue, however, that while the latter implies the former the reverse is not true. So it is possible to see the group as a unit, an 'individual', for rights-holding purposes without seeing it as a person but not the other way around. For the difference between a group as an individual and as a person, see Vincent (1989).
^6	  According to Jones, ‘the collective conception need not be tied to the Interest theory of rights’ and he gives an example of an account (Seumas Miller’s) ‘that owes nothing to that theory’ (Jones 2008, p. 9). But Miller does not provide a justification for group rights so it is unclear how this conception would generate group rights on a different theory. 
^7	  Elsewhere I argue, however, that this need not entail ascribing full-blown agency or ontological status to groups, which is the second premise of the corporate conception so, inasmuch as both premises are necessary for a corporate conception, the choice theory does not require it (Preda, 2011).
^8	  For the application of this label and other strategies, see Simmonds (1998, pp. 202-203).
^9	  I owe this objection and analogy to one of the anonymous reviewers. 
^10	  I am borrowing this term from Morauta (2002, p. 91). 
^11	  Jones gives an example of a sacred site that is a significant place for a culture, which is now represented by a single person. This sacred site is a public good but this individual could, and in fact probably does, have a right to it (Jones, 2007, p. 7).
^12	  It could be argued that this problem should not arise in the context of participatory goods, since one’s interest in a good cannot be fulfilled unless one participates (Réaume, 1988, pp. 14-15). But, as Réaume admits, this problem will indeed arise when ‘there is a divergence between one’s interest in the good and one’s overall interest’ (p. 15). Moreover, if the problem does not arise, ‘the idea of a collective right seems to have no point’ since there will be no one against whom the right needs to be claimed (p. 14).
^13	  A good real-life example is the group of Irish speakers. A relatively large proportion of the Irish community are reasonably competent in speaking Irish and have an interest in sustaining the language. However, a majority of them speak English on a daily basis, thus failing to contribute to the provision of this good.
^14	  As I explained on p. 5.
^15	  Although note that a right to self-determination is a right of a group to make its own rules, which entails not only a claim to non-interference against outsiders but also certain rights (powers) against its own members. Thus any right to self-determination must be based on the corporate conception. 
^16	  I must leave open the possibility that if all members of a group are engaged in such a joint activity, they may hold a right jointly against outsiders, although much depends on how a joint activity is conceptualised. If the right is to be consistent with the collective conception, the activity in question must be neither reducible to individual actions nor be a collective action that presupposes a group agent. 
^17	  This is presumably what Jones means by rights in respect of a participatory good rather than rights to that good. But he accepts that only rights to participatory goods must be group rights (Jones, 2007, p. 12 & 15). 
^18	  Once again, I owe this objection and example to an anonymous reviewer. 
^19	  However, if, as Jones suggests, the collective conception is independent and need not be combined with a specific theory of rights, this argument may not refute the collective conception altogether but only the version that is most common in the literature, which seeks to derive group rights from individual interests.
^20	  See supra note 6.
